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THE WINNER TAKES IT ALL, BUT WHO 
GETS TO PLAY? THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S 
FIRST TO FILE RULE AND JURISDICTION 
Abstract: In 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, 
in United States v. Millenium Laboratories, Inc., that the False Claims Act’s first 
to file rule is nonjurisdictional. This decision followed those by the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Second and D.C. Circuits that came to the same con-
clusion. These decisions stand in opposition to a number of other circuits that, 
prior to 2015, held the first to file rule as jurisdictional. This split emerged after 
the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. United 
States ex rel. Carter, a False Claims Act case where the Court considered the first 
to file rule after considering other nonjurisdictional items, leading some circuits 
to infer that the Supreme Court considered the rule nonjurisdictional. In holding 
the first to file rule nonjurisdictional, the First Circuit followed the Supreme 
Court’s bright line rule preventing jurisdictional treatment absent clear Congres-
sional intent. This Comment argues that the First Circuit’s treatment of the first 
to file rule as nonjurisdictional is correct and fulfills the legislative intent of the 
False Claims Act while still preventing parties from overburdening the judiciary 
with opportunistic suits. 
INTRODUCTION 
From the war profiteers of the Civil War to twenty-first century healthcare 
reimbursement fraudsters, the False Claims Act (FCA) has been the federal 
government’s best weapon against reimbursement fraud for over 150 years.1 
The FCA imposes liability on any person who “knowingly presents . . . a false 
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval . . . to an officer, employee, or 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018); United States v. Millenium Labs., Inc., 
923 F.3d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 2019) (noting that the False Claims Act’s original purpose was to punish 
fraud during the Civil War and that this continues to be the government’s main legal avenue to fight 
fraud), cert. denied sub nom. Estate of Cunningham v. McGuire, No. 19-583, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 338, 
at *1 (2020); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess (Marcus I), 127 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1942) (dis-
cussing the legislative history of the False Claims Act), rev’d on other grounds United States ex rel. 
Marcus v. Hess (Marcus II), 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/V86G-MURS [hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice]. In 
2018, $2.5 billion of the $2.8 billion received under the False Claims Act (FCA) came from the 
healthcare sector. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra. The United States government relies on 
individual whistleblowers to supplement federal enforcement resources. Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. 
Moore, Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697, 1698 (2015). 
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agent of the United States.”2 Individuals may file a FCA claim on behalf of the 
U.S. government; however, the government may decline to intervene in such a 
suit.3 When an individual brings an action on behalf of the government it is 
called a qui tam action, and the person bringing the action is called a relator.4 
The statute permits relators to receive a portion of a qui tam settlement.5 
This share can be a significant amount of money as the largest FCA settle-
ments amount to billions of dollars.6 This is not an easy payday: many relators 
are individuals who put themselves under a great deal of stress by working 
covertly with attorneys and government officials to build a case.7 Despite the 
resulting stress, a New England Journal of Medicine study reported that rela-
tors had non-financial motivations for their claims that were instead based on 
“integrity, altruism or public safety, justice, and self-preservation.”8 
                                                                                                                           
 2 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i). “Knowingly,” as used in the statute, means a person 
has actual knowledge of the false information, acts “in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of 
the information, or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” Id. 
§ 3279(b)(1). The FCA does not require “proof of specific intent to defraud.” Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B). 
 3 Id. § 3730(b)(1)–(2). A plaintiff files in camera and the court seals the complaint for at least 
sixty days before the court may order service on the defendant. Id. § 3730(b)(2). The Government has 
sixty days after it receives the complaint and supporting evidence to decide if it wants to join the case. 
Id. In reality, the government generally files a number of extensions and the case can take years to 
resolve. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in Fraud Litigation Against 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1753, 1835–36 (2010).  
 4 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c); Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 243. The phrase “qui tam” comes from the 
Latin “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” meaning “who as well for 
the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). The term “relator” also originates from Latin, meaning the person who relates or reports the 
information to someone else. Relator, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.
com/word/relator [https://perma.cc/NXC6-REWE].  
 5 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). If the Government joins the qui tam action, subject to certain limita-
tions, the relator receives between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the settlement depending on how 
much the relator’s evidence and participation aided the prosecution. Id. 
 6 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Significant False Claims Act Settlements & Judgments, Fiscal 
Years 2009–2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/79KQ-APTN (noting that all four FCA settle-
ments that totaled over one billion dollars arose from claims against healthcare companies). 
 7 Kesselheim et al., supra note 3, at 1835–36. See generally Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Personal Toll 
of Whistleblowing, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2019, at 30–41 (detailing the harrowing whistleblowing 
experience of a particular relator whose cooperation with the federal government cost him his career). 
A 2010 study looked at a set of seventeen qui tam actions and found that individuals within the re-
ported companies made up the majority of qui tam relators. Kesselheim et al., supra note 3, at 1832. 
In most cases, these internal relators attempted to fix the conduct themselves or reported the fraudu-
lent conduct internally prior to pursuing a qui tam action. Id. at 1834. After reporting outside of the 
company, some of these relators became active participants in the investigation. Id. This participation 
required the relators to go through extreme stress to help gather evidence. Id. This included wearing a 
recording device, traveling to meet with federal officials using their own money, and copying compa-
ny documents. Id. at 1835–36. Moreover, many of these whistleblowers simultaneously attempted to 
conceal their involvement in the investigation from their coworkers. Id.  
 8 Kesselheim et al., supra note 3, at 1834. In fact, many relators reported putting their financial 
livelihoods at risk and some faced financial ruin during the years-long course of their respective inves-
tigations. Id. at 1836. One relator in the study stated: “I just wasn’t able to get a job[;] . . . [i]t went 
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Congress intended to encourage individuals to bring suits through the 
FCA, rather than through class action suits or separate suits based on the same 
underlying information.9 In the absence of clear statutory language, however, 
at least one case permitted recovery by a relator alleging identical facts to a 
prior FCA suit.10 In 1986, Congress rectified this issue by implementing 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), which limits who may intervene or file additional claims 
in the qui tam action.11 Courts have interpreted this provision to be a first to 
file rule.12 A first to file rule prohibits a court from hearing a case if another 
court already has jurisdiction based on an earlier filed claim regarding the 
same issue.13 The overall goal of the rule is twofold: (1) avoiding identical 
suits against one defendant while (2) encouraging individuals to report fraudu-
lent activity.14 The first to file rule also seeks to prevent frivolous suits by 
countless individuals with knowledge of the same fraud who then share the 
proceeds.15 Adding to the complexity, circuit courts have split between treating 
the first to file rule jurisdictionally and evaluating the rule as part of a well-
pleaded complaint.16 The genesis of this split is the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
                                                                                                                           
longer and longer . . . . I had to sell the personal home that I was in[;] . . . I had my cars repossessed[;] 
. . . I lost my 401[k] . . . . I lost everything[,] . . . [a]bsolutely everything.” Id.  
 9 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 244 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25 (1986), as reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266, 5290). 
 10 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25 (acknowledging that “there are few known instances of multiple 
parties intervening in past qui tam cases” but expressing a desire to add statutory language to prevent 
future cases); see, e.g., United States v. Baker-Lockwood Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 48, 50, 52–53 (8th Cir. 
1943) (allowing multiple individual plaintiffs to file FCA claims based on identical facts), vacated per 
curiam sub nom. Nathanson v. United States, 321 U.S. 744, 744 (1944). 
 11 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 244. The additional language added by 
the 1986 amendment states: “When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other 
than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
 12 See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (Lujan I), No. CV-92-1282 SVW, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000) (“Section 3730(b)(5) has been interpreted as 
a ‘first to file’ rule which sets a jurisdictional bar to any related qui tam action.”). 
 13 First to File Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 (“The principle that, when two 
suits are brought by the same parties, regarding the same issues, in two courts of proper jurisdiction, 
the court that first acquires jurisdiction usually retains the suit, to the exclusion of the other court.”). 
In qui tam actions, this determination may not be as simple as determining which party filed first in 
time. See, e.g., Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 202 (noting that eight different relators filed separate 
actions, alleged separate fraud mechanisms, and contended for the proceeds from the settlement). 
When multiple relators file separate claims against a defendant, a court must undertake a material 
facts test in which it determines which individual filed the claim containing the material facts that led 
to the settlement first and thus should receive the monetary reward. Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 252–
53; see also United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 
234 (3d Cir. 1998) (laying out the material elements test to determine what types of claims were 
barred by prior actions under the first to file rule).  
 14 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 252. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 248–49. Three circuit courts now recognize the first to file rule as nonjurisdictional and 
evaluate the qui tam claim under the well-pleaded complaint standard under Federal Rule of Civil 
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tional bright line rule requiring clear legislative intent before interpreting a rule 
as jurisdictional.17 
The latest court to split from the jurisdictional approach is the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals in the 2019 case of United States v. Millenium Laboratories, 
Inc.18 In Millenium Laboratories, the First Circuit evaluated claims from relators 
competing for a share of the government’s $227 million FCA settlement with a 
medical laboratory testing company.19 The court overturned the district decision 
as well as circuit precedent by holding that recent Supreme Court opinions and 
bright line rules show that the first to file rule is nonjurisdictional.20 
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the FCA, the material facts 
test used to evaluate claims under the first to file rule, the nature of jurisdic-
tional rules, and the First Circuit’s ruling in Millenium Laboratories declaring 
the first to file rule nonjurisdictional.21 Part II examines and discusses how the 
first to file rule originally became jurisdictional and a 2015 Supreme Court 
case that changed the interpretation of the first to file rule in three different 
circuits.22 Lastly, Part III argues that the First Circuit’s nonjurisdictional treat-
ment of the FCA’s first to file rule is in line with Supreme Court precedent and 
Congress’s legislative policy goals.23 
                                                                                                                           
Procedure 12(b)(6). See id. at 249; United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853 F.3d 80, 85–86 
(2d Cir. 2017) (holding the first to file rule “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way 
to the jurisdiction of the district courts”); United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 
120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that Congress did not reference jurisdiction explicitly in the first to 
file rule). Nevertheless, a number of other circuits still classify the rule as jurisdictional and will dis-
miss the case if at any point the judge believes the complainant filed suit after the “true” relator. E.g., 
United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 
(2015); United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 
2009); Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 969–70 (6th Cir. 2005); Grynberg v. Koch 
Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes 
Aircraft Co. (Lujan II), 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 17 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141–43 (2012) (noting a 
nonjurisdictional presumption when Congress includes particular jurisdictional language in one sec-
tion of a statute but omits it in another section). 
 18 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 251. 
 19 Id. at 247. 
 20 Id. at 249–51. 
 21 See infra notes 24–79 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 80–112 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 113–141 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE WINNER TAKES IT ALL: A HISTORY OF THE FCA, THE FIRST TO FILE 
RULE, AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S JURISDICTIONAL INTERPRETATION24 
Qui tam actions existed in England for centuries before the United States’ 
passage of statutes like the FCA.25 The Lincoln administration enacted the 
FCA during the Civil War as a way to curtail war profiteering and military con-
tractor fraud.26 The FCA endured and evolved to become one of the federal 
government’s most powerful fraud-fighting tools.27 Section A of this Part dis-
cusses the United States’ adoption of the FCA and how Congress amended the 
FCA in 1986 to encourage more whistleblowers.28 Section B discusses the ma-
terial facts test developed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit.29 Next, Section C discusses jurisdictional rules and the ramifications 
for claimants.30 Lastly, Section D of this Part discusses why the First Circuit 
broke from precedent and recognized the first to file rule as nonjurisdictional.31 
A. The FCA’s Evolution from Wartime Necessity to Modern Essential 
Modern FCA claims usually originate in the healthcare field.32 This focus 
on the healthcare industry is not accidental; Congress strengthened the FCA 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Cf. ABBA, The Winner Takes It All, on SUPER TROUPER (Atlantic Records 1980) (“I’ve played 
all my cards, and that’s what you’ve done too, nothing more to say, no more ace to play, [t]he winner 
takes it all, the loser standing small, beside the victory, that’s her destiny.”).  
 25 Marcus II, 317 U.S. at 541 n.4. In the United States, qui tam actions have been available to 
bring suits for “arming vessels against friendly powers,” “breaches of duty by the Treasurer or the 
Register of the United States,” and “protection of Indians.” Id. 
 26 Marcus I, 127 F.2d at 235. The Senator introducing the FCA in 1863 stated “[t]his bill has been 
prepared at the urgent solicitation of the [military] officers . . . respecting the frauds and corruptions 
practiced in obtaining pay from the Government during the present war. . . . [F]urther legislation is 
pressingly necessary to prevent this great evil.” Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 952 
(1863)). The corruption of these publicly reimbursed contractors “permitted or encouraged this rob-
bing of the government treasury and cruelty to the American soldier.” Id. at 236. Eventually, qui tam 
provisions fell out of favor. Id. at 235. Many early qui tam actions in English law took place between 
collusive parties, and the entire reward went directly to the qui tam informers, creating resentment 
among those paying. Id. This resentment led to legal reforms that eventually phased out or modified 
the payouts for these claims. Id.  
 27 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 244; see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1 (not-
ing the federal government has recovered over $59 billion through FCA claims since 1986). Of the 
$2.8 billion recovered in 2018, $2.1 billion originated with qui tam lawsuits resulting in $301 million 
in payouts to relators. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1. FCA whistleblower activity 
remained strong in 2018, as relators filed 645 new qui tam actions. Id. 
 28 See infra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 54–79 and accompanying text. 
 32 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1. In 2018, $2.5 billion of the $2.8 billion re-
covered under the FCA came from the healthcare industry. Id. These recoveries came from a wide 
range of healthcare entities including drug and medical device manufacturers, laboratories, hospitals, 
pharmacies, and physicians. Id.  
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whistleblower provisions in 1986 in response to increased healthcare reim-
bursement fraud.33 The 1986 amendments sought to supplement scarce gov-
ernment enforcement resources with more relator claims by giving relators the 
option to take a more active role in the litigation.34 The amendments also en-
couraged relators by setting the payout to be between fifteen and twenty-five 
percent of the recovery if the government intervenes, and between twenty-five 
and thirty percent of the recovery if the relator litigates the case.35 Although 
these changes were a boon for potential relators, Congress also added addi-
tional protection for defendants by implementing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).36 
Congress added this provision to avoid “multiple separate suits based on iden-
tical facts and circumstances.”37 Courts have subsequently interpreted this pro-
vision as a first to file rule.38 Relator qui tam actions increased dramatically as 
a result of these changes.39 The first to file rule, however, still required that 
courts apply a test to determine which plaintiff filed first and therefore de-
served the relator’s share.40 
B. The Third Circuit’s Material Facts Test 
The prevailing analysis for determining what falls under the first to file 
rule comes from the Third Circuit’s 1998 decision in United States ex rel. 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (stating that fraud cases were on a steady rise in Government 
programs, particularly programs under the Department of Health and Human Services); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PROGRAMS: A 30-
YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, 8–9 (2006) (noting that rapid increases in healthcare fraud convictions in the 
mid-1980s prompted updates to the FCA). 
 34 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 23–24 (stating that the main intent of Con-
gress’s FCA amendments was to encourage more private enforcement suits). This change acknowl-
edged an issue for many potential reporters: coming forward puts them at personal and financial risk. 
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25. As such, Congress felt that relators deserved to participate more closely 
with government officials and see the fraud pursued up close. Id. 
 35 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2). Previously, relators were only entitled to up to ten percent of the 
recovery if the government intervened and up to twenty-five percent if they brought it as an individu-
al. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 27. 
 36 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25 (clarifying that only the government may 
intervene in qui tam lawsuits and the FCA does not create an opportunity for class actions or multiple 
separate suits based on “identical facts and circumstances”). 
 37 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25. 
 38 See, e.g., Lujan I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *10 (adopting the view that Section 
3730(b)(5) is a first to file rule). 
 39 Id. at *23–24; see Fraud Statistics—Overview Oct. 1, 1986–Sept. 30, 2018, Civil Division, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1080696/download [https://perma.cc/
4VJH-VQGP] (demonstrating large year-over-year increases in both qui tam actions and recovery 
amounts since 1986).  
 40 See LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 232 (noting the need to determine the proper interpretation of the first 
to file rule before evaluating the plaintiff’s claims). 
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LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc.41 There, the Third 
Circuit considered a challenge by three separate parties attempting to acquire a 
share of a settlement arising from prior qui tam claims by a different set of 
three parties.42 The later-filing relators asserted that the court should only ap-
ply the first to file rule to claims containing the exact same facts as those sup-
porting a prior claim.43 The court rejected this argument, becoming the first 
circuit court to hold that the first to file rule applies, not only to identical 
claims, but also to claims that state the essential facts of a previously filed 
claim, even if they include somewhat different details.44 This came to be 
known as the material facts test.45 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1188–89; LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 234. Many courts apply the material facts 
test, also known as the “essential facts test,” to determine if a qui tam suit violates the first to file rule. 
See, e.g., Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 252–53 (applying the material facts test and determining a later 
filed claim did not violate the first to file rule because it did not plead the same essential facts as the 
prior claim); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 
2009) (noting that all courts that have addressed the first to file rule have used the material facts test 
(citing LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 232–33)); United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the first to file rule to claims with slightly vary-
ing facts that alleged the same underlying fraudulent scheme (citing Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1189)). 
 42 LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 231. All six of the claims alleged that the defendant clinical laboratory 
operator billed Medicare and Medicaid for unnecessary medical testing. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged 
that the defendant circumvented Medicaid and Medicare spending controls in order to receive addi-
tional reimbursement. Id. Three different parties filed three different suits in federal courts in Pennsyl-
vania, Texas, and California. Id. The courts consolidated these three suits into one action in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania. Id. The Department of Justice intervened in the consolidated action and 
negotiated a $325 million settlement with the defendant. Id. Before finalization, however, the second 
set of relators filed their separate suits in different courts. Id. Those actions were also transferred to 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; however, the court did not combine these later suits into the 
original consolidated case. Id. 
 43 Id. at 232. Two of the later plaintiffs agreed that the settlement agreement covered their allega-
tions but argued that their allegations were not identical to those of the original relators and thus they 
should share in the claim. Id. The trial court disagreed and barred these plaintiffs from sharing in the 
recovery. Id. at 231. The third plaintiff, LaCorte, claimed his allegations differed in at least five re-
spects from the prior suit and settlement agreement. Id. The lower court held that one claim about 
urinalysis testing could move forward as a separate suit, but the settlement agreement covered the 
other four claims, and thus the first to file rule barred suit for those. Id. All three of these later plain-
tiffs appealed and argued that the first to file rule only barred suits based on identical facts. Id. at 232. 
The defendant medical laboratory company, the government, and the original three plaintiffs asserted 
that the first to file rule forbade not only identical claims but also claims based on similar facts. Id. 
 44 Id. at 232–33; see also Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1188–89 (rejecting the identical facts test and 
adopting the material facts test). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on its interpretation of the 
plain statutory language of “related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.” LaCorte, 
149 F.3d at 232 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)). It agreed with the district court that the first to file 
rule barred identical as well as similar claims in a later filed suit. Id. at 232–33. The court reasoned 
that barring only identical facts would defeat the legislative purpose of the first to file rule to balance 
fraud fighting power with preventing frivolous suits. Id. at 233. 
 45 Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1188. 
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C. The Power and Peril of Jurisdictional Rules 
Further complicating matters, the ability of a federal court to hear a case 
depends on the circuit’s view on whether the first to file rule is jurisdictional.46 
Courts that consider it jurisdictional must dismiss a case for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction at such time the judge believes the relator did not file first.47 
As such, cases may proceed for years before being dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, resulting in a waste of judicial resources.48 Courts that consider the 
rule nonjurisdictional, on the other hand, evaluate the first to file rule as part of 
the well-pleaded complaint standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).49 
As a result of the drastic consequences of jurisdictional rules, the Supreme 
Court has tried to clarify when courts should interpret rules as jurisdictional.50 
The Court adopted a bright line rule to determine if a statutory limitation is ju-
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d 248–49. Three circuit courts now recognize the first to file rule 
as nonjurisdictional and evaluate the qui tam claim under the well-pleaded complaint standard under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See id. at 249; Hayes, 853 F.3d at 85–86 (Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals); Heath, 791 F.3d at 120–21 (D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals). Nevertheless, a num-
ber of other circuits still classify the rule as jurisdictional. E.g., Carter, 710 F.3d at 181 (Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals); Branch Consultants, 560 F.3d at 376 (Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals); Wal-
burn, 431 F.3d at 969–70 (Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals); Grynberg, 390 F.3d at 1278 (Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals); Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1183 (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 47 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3); Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249. Jurisdictional rules affect 
a court’s ability to adjudicate a case based on subject-matter jurisdiction. Unanimous Supreme Court 
Scolds Lower Court Over Appellate Deadline Rule, FISHER PHILLIPS: LEGAL ALERT (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-unanimous-supreme-court-scolds-lower-court-over 
[https://perma.cc/4A4T-HJF8]. This issue can have a significant impact on courts and litigants. See 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) (“Jurisdictional rules may also result in the waste of 
judicial resources and may [unfairly prejudice] litigants.”). Parties may raise subject-matter jurisdic-
tion claims at any time during or after the litigation. Id. at 434–35. Moreover, subject-matter jurisdic-
tion can never be waived and a court must act sua sponte to dismiss the action if it becomes aware the 
case lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
 48 Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153; Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513–14. A judge may dismiss a 
claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after the jury returns a verdict for the plaintiff, even if the 
defendant did not raise the claim at any prior point in the litigation. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504 
(noting that the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
occurred after the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff when the defendant raised the jurisdictional 
issue of employer size in a Title VII case). 
 49 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249; Hayes, 853 F.3d at 85–86 (holding the first to file rule 
“does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts”); 
Heath, 791 F.3d at 120–21 (noting Congress did not reference jurisdiction explicitly in the first to file 
rule). The well-pleaded complaint standard does not allow the court to act sua sponte and restricts the 
timing of dismissal to when there are motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, or motions 
for directed verdicts. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(h)(1)–(3); Andrew J. Hoffman et al., First Circuit 
Reverses Course on its First-to-File Rule, DLA PIPER: LITIGATION ALERT (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/05/first-circuit-reverses-course-on-its-
first-to-file-rule/ [https://perma.cc/J9MV-2AEZ]. 
 50 See Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153 (stating that absent clear congressional intent, 
courts should treat rules as nonjurisdictional); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16 (same).  
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risdictional: courts must inquire if Congress clearly stated the rule is jurisdic-
tional and only then treat it as such.51 This inquiry does not require Congress to 
use specific statutory language or “incant magic words” to create a jurisdictional 
rule.52 Rather, courts consider previous interpretations of similar provisions and 
Congress’s use of jurisdictional language elsewhere in the statute.53 
D. The First Circuit’s Shift to Nonjurisdictional  
Treatment of the First to File Rule 
The First Circuit confronted the issue of jurisdiction under the FCA’s first 
to file rule in Millenium Laboratories.54 In Millenium Laboratories, the gov-
ernment settled an FCA claim with the defendant urinalysis company for $227 
million plus interest and designated 15% as the relator’s award.55 The settle-
ment did not indicate how the nearly $34 million payout would be divided 
among the eight relators.56 The main relator at issue in the court’s material 
facts test was Robert Cunningham, the first of the eight relators to file an FCA 
claim against Millennium.57 Cunningham, an attorney, worked as a compliance 
officer at a rival testing company.58 He filed suit in December of 2009 in the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.59 Meanwhile, 
relator Mark McGuire, a former third-party medical center employee, filed his 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153; Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15; see also Gonzalez, 565 
U.S. at 141–43 (holding a rule was nonjurisdictional because of the general presumption that Con-
gress acts intentionally when it includes particular jurisdictional language in one section of a statute 
but omits it in another section of the same act). 
 52 Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153–54. 
 53 Id.; Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 143. As a result of this bright line rule, the Supreme Court in recent 
years took many rules that were once considered jurisdictional and held they are nonjurisdictional. See, 
e.g., Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 152 (holding that filing an administrative appeal after a 180-
day statutory deadline was not a jurisdictional issue); see also Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 137 (holding that 
neglecting to indicate the requisite constitutional issue in a certificate of appealability does not remove 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the appeals court); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15 (holding that the 
statutory requirement for employer size in Title VII claims was nonjurisdictional). 
 54 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 244. 
 55 Id. at 247. The complaints alleged that the defendant, Millennium Laboratories, induced exces-
sive and unnecessary methods of drug testing that resulted in fraudulent government reimbursement. 
Id. at 245–47. Millennium Laboratories did not raise the first to file issue and agreed to the settlement 
before the district court ruled on Mark McGuire’s cross-claim. Id. at 248. As such, although the case 
names Millennium Laboratories as a party, the only issue left to litigate was who should receive the 
relator monetary award. Id. at 247–48. 
 56 Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 202. Of the eight relator claims, the government chose to 
intervene in three. Id. 
 57 Id. at 201–02. 
 58 Id. Robert Cunningham alleged that Millennium submitted unnecessary testing claims and lied 
about their necessity. Id. In addition, Cunningham claimed Millennium induced doctors to seek fraud-
ulent government reimbursement. Id. The government did not intervene in Cunningham’s case. Id. at 
202. Eventually, however, his claims were either jurisdictionally barred or dismissed for lack of par-
ticularity. Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 246. 
 59 Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 201. 
2020] The False Claims Act’s First to File Rule and Jurisdiction II.-419 
qui tam suit in January 2012.60 After the settlement finalized, McGuire filed a 
cross-claim seeking a declaratory judgment awarding him the entire payout.61 
In response, four of the seven other relators filed motions to dismiss for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
based on the first to file rule’s jurisdictional bar.62 At the time of the district 
court’s decision in 2016, the First Circuit still treated the first to file rule as a 
jurisdictional issue.63 
The Massachusetts District Court’s material facts analysis determined that 
Cunningham’s claim provided the notice that resulted in the government’s in-
quiry and that McGuire’s claim contained the essential facts or same elements 
of fraud described in Cunningham’s earlier suit.64 This notice standard, later 
rejected by the appeals court, is not part of the usual material facts test in the 
First Circuit.65 Nevertheless, the district court held that the first to file rule ju-
risdictionally barred McGuire’s claim under Rule 12(b)(1).66 
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and held, for the first time in its ju-
risdiction, that the first to file rule was nonjurisdictional.67 Instead, the court 
evaluated the first to file rule based on whether the plaintiff filed a well-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 202. Similar to Cunningham, McGuire’s action also alleged Millennium requested fraud-
ulent reimbursement and induced physicians to seek fraudulent government reimbursement. Id. The 
government intervened in McGuire’s case. Id. 
 61 Id. McGuire claimed he was the first relator to file a qui tam complaint that alleged the facts 
that led to the settlement and thus that he was the first to file and should receive the full relator share. 
Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 248. 
 62 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 202; Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may assert that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim 
and thus cannot hear the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Here, the parties filing the motion claimed that 
the court could not hear McGuire’s cross-claim because it violated the first to file rule and thus, based 
on circuit precedent, the court lacked jurisdiction over it. Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 248. 
 63 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 203 (citing United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care of the Fla. Keys, 
Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 772 F.3d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 2014)); see also United States ex rel. 
Wilson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Inc., 750 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding the FCA’s first to 
file rule is jurisdictional). 
 64 Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 205. The district court held Cunningham’s claim sufficiently 
alleged the relevant fraud discussed in the settlement agreement. Id. The settlement agreement cov-
ered “excessive and unnecessary” urine drug tests ordered by physicians and physician referrals in 
violation of the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute. Id. at 202. 
 65 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d 254 (holding that “mere notice” of a different fraud that the gov-
ernment did not pursue is not enough to trigger the FCA’s first to file rule). 
 66 Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 206. The court agreed with McGuire that Millennium violated 
the FCA when it altered its incentive structure for doctors by offering free tests and encouraging the 
physicians to seek insurance reimbursement, all in an effort to avoid Medicaid’s revised reimburse-
ment rules for multiple tests. Id. This new incentive structure, not the structure underlying Cunning-
ham’s claim, formed the basis for the settlement agreement. Id. Nevertheless, the court disagreed with 
McGuire’s cross-claim that this constituted “a wholly different fraud” from Cunningham’s allegation 
and thus held Cunningham’s description of the fraud included “all the essential elements” of the con-
duct in the settlement agreement. Id. 
 67 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 248–49. 
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pleaded complaint.68 The court cited several reasons for this decision, chief 
among them being the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Kellogg Brown & 
Root Services v. United States ex rel. Carter.69 The Supreme Court decision 
itself did not state the first to file rule was nonjurisdictional.70 Rather, the struc-
ture of the Kellogg opinion led the First Circuit to interpret that the Court was 
addressing the rule on nonjurisdictional terms.71 Specifically, the Supreme Court 
addressed the first to file rule only after discussing a nonjurisdictional statute of 
limitations issue.72 If the Supreme Court intended to interpret the first to file rule 
as jurisdictional, the First Circuit inferred, it would have taken it up prior to the 
statute of limitations issue, because jurisdiction would have been necessary to 
hear the rest of the case.73 Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction was not at issue in 
the Court’s decision-making process.74 The First Circuit also applied the Su-
preme Court’s bright line rule and held that there was no indication Congress 
meant for the rule to be jurisdictional.75 
After making this procedural determination, the First Circuit applied 
LaCorte’s material facts test to determine if Cunningham was indeed the first 
to file.76 In contrast to the district court, the First Circuit held McGuire’s claim 
did not contain the same material facts as Cunningham’s because the two 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 251 (citing Heath, 791 F.3d at 121). 
 69 See id. at 249 (recognizing that recent case law from the Supreme Court and other federal cir-
cuit courts casts doubt on the First Circuit’s previous recognition of the first to file rule as jurisdic-
tional) See generally Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1978 (reviewing a first to file issue after a statute of limita-
tions issue). 
 70 Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1978; see Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249. 
 71 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249 (citing Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1970). 
 72 Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1978; Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249. In United States ex rel. Heath v. 
AT&T, Inc., decided in 2015, the D.C. Circuit stated that the Kellogg opinion structure, combined with 
the lack of statutory language, supported its holding that the first to file rule is nonjurisdictional. 791 
F.3d at 120–21. 
 73 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals also cited Kellogg to support holding the first to file rule nonjurisdictional. Hayes, 
853 F.3d at 85–86; Heath, 791 F.3d at 120–21. 
 74 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249. 
 75 Id. at 250 (“Neither statutory text nor context nor legislative history suggests otherwise.”). The 
court stated that prior circuit cases finding the first to file rule jurisdictional did not apply the Supreme 
Court’s bright line test and thus held no precedential value. Id. In applying this test, the First Circuit first 
analyzed the statutory text and observed no language indicating a jurisdictional rule. Id. Next, the court 
looked to the surrounding provisions in the statute that explicitly referenced jurisdiction. Id. The presence 
of specific jurisdictional language elsewhere in the statute led the First Circuit to reason that Congress 
intended other parts of the statute to act jurisdictionally, but not the first to file rule. Id. Lastly, the court 
reviewed the legislative history and held that a nonjurisdictional first to file rule still met Congress’s 
intent to prevent too many actions based on identical underlying facts. Id. at 250–51. 
 76 Id. at 252–53; see LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 232–33. The court’s goal in this analysis was to deter-
mine whether Cunningham’s complaint contained “all the essential facts of the fraud McGuire al-
leged.” Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 252. Specifically, the First Circuit held that McGuire’s com-
plaint covered fraud that involved a different testing method that occurred during a different phase of 
the testing process. Id. at 254. 
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claims alleged different frauds accomplished through different methods.77 As 
such, McGuire successfully established he was the first to file a claim alleging 
the material facts of the fraud stated in the settlement.78 The First Circuit there-
fore reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case.79 
II. THE NAME OF THE GAME: THE NINTH CIRCUIT SETS THE  
RULE BUT THE SUPREME COURT TURNS THE TIDE80 
Case law created the first to file rule’s jurisdictional treatment, not Con-
gress.81 Section A of this Part discusses how an influential Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision led to the rise of treating the first to file rule as a jurisdictional 
rule.82 Section B reviews recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that ignited the 
nonjurisdictional shift in federal courts, leading to the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ decision in 2019 in United States v. Millenium Laboratories, Inc.83 
A. The Ninth Circuit Charts the Course 
One of the first courts to review the first to file rule was the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia in its 1989 decision in United States ex rel. Erickson v. Ameri-
can Institute of Biological Sciences.84 In Erickson, the court reviewed a num-
ber of issues related to a government employee’s qui tam suit against a private 
contractor.85 The first to file issue arose because the defendant had already 
filed its own False Claims Act’s (FCA) qui tam action against a separate sub-
contractor based on the same underlying facts.86 The court analyzed the issue 
of first to file at the end of its opinion, after deciding other dispositive issues 
that would have led to the dismissal of the case regardless of the first to file 
analysis.87 This analysis did not state the first to file rule was jurisdictional, 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 254. The government’s settlement with Millennium reflected this 
version of the fraud, rather than Cunningham’s version. Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 255. 
 80 Cf. ABBA, The Name of the Game, on ABBA THE ALBUM (Atlantic Records 1977) (“Got a 
feeling, you give me no choice, but it means a lot to me . . . [s]o I wanna know, what’s the name of the 
game?”). 
 81 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2018) (lacking jurisdictional wording in the statute); infra notes 
84–96 and accompanying text. See generally False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. 
 82 See infra notes 84–98 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 99–112 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Millenium Labs., Inc., 
923 F.3d 240, 249–51 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Estate of Cunningham v. McGuire, No. 
19-583, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 338, at *1 (2020). 
 84 716 F. Supp. 908, 918–19 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 85 Id. at 911. The private contractor was working on a government project attempting to develop a 
malaria vaccine. Id. at 910. 
 86 Id. at 911. 
 87 Id. at 919 (noting that the plaintiff’s failure to observe the statute’s mandatory filing and ser-
vice requirements compelled dismissal). The opinion’s structure was similar to that of the Supreme 
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rather, it stated that the FCA’s new provision under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) 
established a first in time rule.88 Ultimately, the court barred the plaintiff’s 
claim because it alleged the same facts as the prior complaint.89 
A decade later in 2001, the Ninth Circuit looked to the Erickson decision 
in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.90 There, the plaintiff al-
leged violations of the FCA stemming from the defendant military contractor 
mischarging the government for project costs.91 The defendant challenged the 
claim under the first to file rule and contended that another relator brought a 
similar suit, thereby barring this plaintiff’s action.92 The United States District 
Court for the Central District of California cited the Erickson decision and de-
termined the first to file rule was a jurisdictional bar.93 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, without further analysis, that the first to file rule was jurisdic-
tional and thus subject to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction.94 The court upheld the lower court’s decision that the plaintiff’s claim 
                                                                                                                           
Court’s opinion in Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. United States ex rel. Carter, which led the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to infer the first to file rule was nonjurisdictional. See 
id.; see also 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (2015) (considering the first to file issue after a nonjurisdictional 
statute of limitations issue); United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 121 n.4 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (citing Kellogg to support nonjurisdictional treatment of the FCA’s first to file rule). 
 88 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012); Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 918–19 (stating the statute establishes 
a first in time rule, which blocks subsequent qui tam suits based on the same underlying facts). The 
difference between a first in time rule and a first to file rule is unclear from the court’s decision. Er-
ickson, 716 F. Supp. at 918–19. The opinion did not discuss a jurisdictional component as part its 
“first in time” rule. Id. 
 89 Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 919. The court found that this first in time rule clearly barred the 
claims regarding improper bonus payments to a government contractor because they relied on the 
same facts supporting a prior claim. Id. For a separate FCA fraud claim, the court concluded more 
information was necessary to determine if the claims relied on the same underlying facts. Id. at 919. 
 90 United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (Lujan II), 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 
2001); Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 918–19; see United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (Lujan 
I), No. CV-92-1282 SVW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000) (citing 
Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 918). These decisions took place prior to the Supreme Court’s establishment 
of a bright line test for jurisdictional rules. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006) 
(implementing the bright line rule in 2006); Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1183 (confirming the jurisdictional 
nature of the first to file rule in 2001). 
 91 Lujan I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *4–5. 
 92 Id. at *7. 
 93 Id. at *10 (“Section 3730(b)(5) has been interpreted as a ‘first to file’ rule which sets a jurisdic-
tional bar to any related qui tam action” (citing Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 918–19)). The district 
court’s opinion did not, however, explain how it inferred from Erickson that the rule was jurisdiction-
al. See id. The district court also pointed to the policy goals of the 1986 amendments to prevent qui tam 
actions from turning into class action suits while still encouraging relators to come forward to aid in 
recovery. Id. 
 94 Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1186. The Ninth Circuit adopted the lower court’s jurisdictional decision 
without further analysis, simply referring to the statutory provision as “the 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) 
[first to file] jurisdictional bar.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also adopted the material facts test to determine if 
the plaintiff’s claim was jurisdictionally barred by the first to file rule. Id. at 1188–89 (citing United 
States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 233–34 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
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was based on the same material facts as the prior claim and thus jurisdictional-
ly barred by the first to file rule.95 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lujan influenced other circuits, as it be-
came the citing decision stating the FCA’s first to file rule is a jurisdictional 
bar.96 Some of these decisions also occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s 2006 
creation of a bright line rule in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. and provided no fur-
ther elaboration on why the rule is jurisdictional.97 Post-Arbaugh decisions 
holding the rule jurisdictional do not discuss the bright line rule and instead 
rely on circuit precedent to maintain the jurisdictional approach.98 
B. The Supreme Court Signals a Change 
In 2015, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. 
United States ex rel. Carter ignited a change in the way courts thought about the 
first to file rule.99 The Court confronted a qui tam case that the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had barred under the first to file rule.100 
The main focus of the Court’s FCA analysis was on the definition of the word 
“pending” in the statute, rather than any jurisdictional component.101 The import 
of this analysis, however, is where it occurred in the opinion: after a nonjurisdic-
tional statute of limitation issue.102 This opinion structure indicated that the 
Court may not consider the FCA’s first to file rule as jurisdictional.103 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. at 1189. 
 96 See, e.g., Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 969–70 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1187); Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 
2004) (citing Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1183). Some of these decisions then became the citing decisions 
for later circuits that also found the first to file provision to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States 
ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Walburn, 431 F.3d at 970 
to conclude the first to file rule is jurisdictional), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Kellogg, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1970. 
 97 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15; see e.g., Walburn, 431 F.3d at 969–70 (decided in 2005); Gryn-
berg, 390 F.3d at 1278 (decided in 2004). 
 98 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15; see e.g., Carter, 866 F.3d at 203 n.1 (recognizing the ongoing 
circuit split over the jurisdictional nature of the first to file rule but continuing the jurisdictional ap-
proach based on circuit precedent); Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 202 (same). 
 99 See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing how Kellogg’s structure influenced 
the D.C. Circuit to find the first to file rule nonjurisdictional). 
 100 Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1974. In this case, the plaintiff filed suit against contractors that provid-
ed water purification systems to the U.S. military in Iraq. Id. The plaintiff alleged the contractors 
fraudulently charged the government for nonexistent or poorly executed service. Id. The government 
decided against participation in the suit. Id. 
 101 Id. at 1978–79. The defendants moved to dismiss claims based on underlying facts similar to 
the facts in other cases dismissed in other jurisdictions. Id. The Supreme Court stated the word “pend-
ing” meant that a dismissed case did not bar later claims based on similar or identical facts. Id. Thus, 
the earlier case dismissed for failure to prosecute did not bar the current claim from moving forward. 
Id. at 1979. 
 102 See Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1978; Heath, 791 F.3d at 121 n.4 (stating it was noteworthy that the 
Supreme Court addressed the FCA’s first to file rule after a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations 
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A month later, in United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., the D.C. Cir-
cuit issued a clear opinion: the FCA’s first to file rule was nonjurisdictional.104 
In making this determination, the D.C. Circuit noted the influence of Kellogg 
and took into account the Supreme Court’s bright line rule.105 In applying the 
bright line rule, the court stated that the FCA first to file provision lacked ju-
risdictional language and that no support for this view existed in the legislative 
history.106 As such, the court held that defendants must now raise a first to file 
challenge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instead of Rule 
12(b)(1).107 
The First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals cited this D.C. Circuit 
opinion in their later decisions holding the first to file rule to be nonjurisdic-
tional.108 Prior to Millenium Laboratories, decided in 2019, the First Circuit 
acknowledged that Kellogg created some uncertainty in its jurisdictional inter-
pretation of the first to file rule.109 The Kellogg and Heath opinions influenced 
the First Circuit to turn this uncertainty into a solid nonjurisdictional stance.110 
The court recognized these opinions first in its reasoning for overturning the 
jurisdictional interpretation before going on to discuss the application of the 
                                                                                                                           
issue and nothing in the opinion used jurisdictional terms). Of note, however, is that, in its rehearing 
of Kellogg, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals continued to hold that the first to file rule was juris-
dictional. Carter, 866 F.3d at 203 n.1. 
 103 See Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1978; Heath, 791 F.3d at 121 n.4. 
 104 Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1970 (decided May 26, 2015); Heath, 791 F.3d at 119 (decided June 23, 
2015). 
 105 Heath, 791 F.3d at 120, 121 n.4. The opinion noted that “the Supreme Court addressed the 
operation of the first-to-file bar on decidedly nonjurisdictional terms, raising the issue after it decided 
a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations issue.” Id. at 121 n.4. 
 106 Id. at 120 (“When Congress wanted limitations on False Claims Act suits to operate with ju-
risdictional force, it said so explicitly.”). The court went on to point out several other places in the 
False Claims Act, such as § 3730(e)(1) and § 3730(e)(2), where Congress did specifically indicate 
those rules were jurisdictional. Id. With regards to the first to file rule, however, the court noted that 
Congress did not reference jurisdiction expressly, thereby making the rule nonjurisdictional. Id. at 
120–21. 
 107 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Unlike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court does 
not have a sua sponte responsibility under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the case if it believes the first to 
file rule bars the suit. Id. R. 12(h)(2)–(3). A Rule 12(b)(6) defense may be raised in an answer or any 
other pleading allowed by Rule 7(a) through a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) 
or at trial. Id. R. 12(h)(2).  
 108 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 244; United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853 F.3d 
80, 85 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 109 Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 250; see United States ex rel. Kelly v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 
827 F.3d 5, 12 n.9 (1st Cir. 2016) (declining to definitively confirm the first to file rule was jurisdic-
tional in favor of deciding the case on separate issues); United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica 
Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 6 n.2 (1st Cir. 2015) (same). 
 110 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249 (discussing Kellogg and Heath to support the proposi-
tion that “new developments cast serious doubt on our prior characterization of the first-to-file rule as 
jurisdictional”). 
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bright line rule.111 Thus, though the First Circuit wavered in prior decisions, 
the presence of the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit decisions appeared to push 
the First Circuit to find the first to file rule nonjurisdictional.112 
III. FACING ITS WATERLOO: JUDICIAL POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
SUPPORT NONJURISDICTIONAL TREATMENT OF THE FIRST TO FILE RULE113 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision in 
2019 in United States v. Millenium Laboratories, Inc. accomplished two major 
policy goals.114 Part A discusses how the nonjurisdictional approach achieves 
the first of these goals by removing an unnecessary application of judicial re-
striction.115 Part B discusses how the nonjurisdictional approach maintains the 
legislative intent for the False Claims Act’s (FCA) first to file rule to encour-
age whistleblowing without encouraging latecomers’ opportunistic suits.116 
A. Removing Unnecessary Jurisdictional Restrictions 
The first policy goal—removing unnecessary judicial restrictions from ju-
risdictional rules—follows the Supreme Court’s institution of a bright line 
test.117 The First Circuit’s shift to nonjurisdictional treatment in Millenium La-
boratories adheres to this bright line test and carries the support of statutory 
language.118 The plain language of the first to file rule does not speak of juris-
                                                                                                                           
 111 Id. at 249–50. The First Circuit also recognized it had never truly questioned whether the first 
to file rule was jurisdictional; it only seemed to make a decision in dicta. Id. at 250. After critically 
evaluating its position, the court determined that prior rulings failed the bright line rule and thus 
should no longer be followed. Id. 
 112 See id. at 250; see also Barry Bridges, Second Whistleblower Deemed First-to-File in False 
Claims Suit, NEW ENGLAND IN-HOUSE (Aug. 26, 2019) (“[T]he panel was persuaded by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in [Kellogg]”),  https://newenglandinhouse.com/2019/08/26/second-
whistleblower-deemed-first-to-file-in-false-claims-suit/ [https://perma.cc/Q3FE-2PRP]. 
 113 Cf. ABBA, Waterloo, on WATERLOO (Atlantic Records 1974) (“I feel like I win when I lose 
. . . finally facing my Waterloo.”). 
 114 See infra notes 117–141 and accompanying text (arguing that the policy goals of removing 
unnecessary judicial restrictions and restoring the balance between plaintiffs and defendants underlie 
the First Circuit’s decision). 
 115 See infra notes 117–127 and accompanying text. 
 116 See infra notes 128–141 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (stating the Supreme Court 
adopted the bright line test, based on an inquiry into Congressional intent, to reduce jurisdictional 
rules); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006) (discussing the bright line test for ju-
risdictional rules). The Supreme Court has overturned a number of jurisdictional classifications using 
this analysis. See, e.g., Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 154 (instituting a 180-day statutory dead-
line for filing administrative appeals); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141–43 (2012) (requiring a 
judge to indicate the requisite constitutional issue in a certificate of appealability); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 
at 514–15 (highlighting the statutory requirement for size of employer in Title VII claims). 
 118 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2018) (“[W]hen a person brings an action under this subsection, 
no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts under-
lying the pending action.”); Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153 (adopting the bright line rule); 
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diction.119 That is not the end of the inquiry, however, because Congress does 
not need to “incant magic words” for a provision to be jurisdictional.120 
Throughout the False Claims Act, Congress was clear when it intended for a 
provision to be jurisdictional.121 The fact that Congress chose to mark those 
provisions as jurisdictional but not the first to file rule is a clear sign Congress 
did not intend for it to be jurisdictional.122 
Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did 
not have the benefit of this bright line rule 2001 when it decided United States 
ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.123 In light of this bright line rule, however, 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lujan becomes questionable due to the FCA’s 
lack of clear jurisdictional language.124 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit provid-
ed little reasoning for upholding the district court’s opinion in Lujan, which 
held the first to file rule was jurisdictional in one sentence, written in passive 
voice, and drew support from the 1989 decision in United States ex rel. Erick-
son v. American Institute of Biological Sciences.125 It is no surprise the district 
court wrote in the passive voice: the Erickson court’s decision did not state the 
                                                                                                                           
United States v. Millenium Labs., Inc., 923 F.3d 240, 249–51 (1st Cir. 2019) cert. denied sub nom. 
Estate of Cunningham v. McGuire, No. 19-583, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 338, at *1 (2020) (noting the Su-
preme Court’s bright line rule in addition to the nonjurisdictional implication of Kellogg Brown & 
Root Services v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978-79 (2015). See generally False 
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.  
 119 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
 120 See Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153–54 (noting the analysis must also consider fac-
tors such as prior rulings on the provision and use of jurisdictional language elsewhere in the statute 
before declaring a rule jurisdictional). 
 121 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought by a 
former or present member of the armed forces . . . against a member of the armed forces arising out of 
such person’s service in the armed forces.”); id. § 3730(e)(2) (stating that no jurisdiction exists in 
claims brought against certain government officials if the government knew of the information at the 
time of the claim); see also United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112 120–21 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (holding that Congress clearly indicated the jurisdictional provisions elsewhere in the False 
Claims Act (FCA)). See generally Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 141–43 (noting that when Congress specifi-
cally uses jurisdictional language in one section of a statute but does not use it in another section of 
the same statute it does so purposefully).  
 122 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); Heath, 791 F.3d at 120 (stating that the FCA’s language shows 
Congress was clear when it wanted jurisdictional limits). 
 123 See generally United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (Lujan II), 243 F.3d 1181 
(9th Cir. 2001) (predating Arbaugh by five years). The Supreme Court most clearly began to delineate 
the bright line rule in 2006. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (noting a lack of disciplined use of jurisdic-
tion for rules without clear statutory language or Congressional intent). 
 124 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 (“[W]hen Congress does not rank a 
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdiction-
al in character.”); Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1186 (holding the first to file rule was jurisdictional). 
 125 See Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 1186; United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (Lujan I), 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000) (“Section 3730(b)(5) has been inter-
preted as a ‘first to file’ rule which sets a jurisdictional bar to any related qui tam action.” (citing Unit-
ed States ex rel. Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Scis., 716 F. Supp. 908, 918–19 (E.D. Va. 
1989)). 
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first to file rule creates a jurisdictional bar; rather, it merely stated 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(b)(5) is a first in time rule.126 As such, Lujan, the landmark case upon 
which many circuits relied in determining the first to file rule was jurisdiction-
al, is far from definitive judicial reasoning.127 
B. The Material Facts Test Continues to Prevent Opportunistic Suits 
Removing the jurisdictional element meets the second policy goal of the 
first to file rule by restoring the balance between encouraging plaintiffs to file 
qui tam suits and protecting defendants from duplicative suits.128 The new 
treatment of first to file challenges will occur at the time specified for failure to 
state a claim challenges under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).129 
This will keep first to file challenges contained to predictable points in the liti-
gation and prevent potential surprise dismissals for lack of jurisdiction based 
on defense motions or sua sponte actions of the court.130 Lujan’s jurisdictional 
interpretation attempted to adhere faithfully to Congress’s purpose in enacting 
the first to file rule and avoid creating class action suits or multiple separate 
suits on the same set of facts.131 This decision had the opposite effect, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 918. Further, the Erickson court addressed the first to file rule after 
nonjurisdictional issues, such as the FCA’s filing and service requirements. Id. at 911–12. The Erickson 
court noted the dispositive force of those requirements and only addressed the first to file issue in case 
the plaintiff successfully appealed the filing and service requirements. Id. at 918–19. Similar to the 
D.C. Circuit’s logic in United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., the structure of the Erickson v. Amer-
ican Institute of Biological Sciences opinion indicates the court did not consider the first to file rule 
jurisdictional. See Heath, 791 F.3d at 121 n.4 (noting the Supreme Court raised the first to file issue 
after the nonjurisdictional statute of limitations issue (citing Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1978); Erickson, 
716 F. Supp. at 918–19 (addressing first to file issue after other dispositive issues). 
 127 See Lujan I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *10; see, e.g., Walburn v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 969–70 (6th Cir. 2005); Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 
1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004). These circuits’ decisions then became the citing decisions for other cir-
cuits that later held the first to file provision was jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carter 
v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Walburn) (stating the first to file rule is 
jurisdictional), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Kellogg, 135 S. Ct. at 1970. 
 128 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 251. The change in treatment of the first to file rule does not 
alter the evaluation of potential duplicate claims under the material facts test, rather, it limits the de-
fense’s options on when to file such a challenge. See id. at 250–51 (holding the first to file rule should 
be evaluated under a well-pleaded complaint standard, then applying the material facts test in the same 
manner as prior precedent). 
 129 Id. at 251; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) defense may be raised in an answer or 
any other pleading allowed by Rule 7(a), through a motion for judgement on the pleadings under Rule 
12(c), or at trial. Id. R. 12(h)(2). 
 130 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 249 (“Characterizing a rule as jurisdictional renders it unique 
in our adversarial system.”). A challenge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may be 
raised at any time and a court must raise it if, at any time, it determines the matter lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1), 12(h)(3). Meanwhile, the court does not have a sua sponte re-
sponsibility under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the case if it believes the first to file rule bars the suit. Id. 
R. 12(h)(2)–(3). 
 131 See Lujan I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100, at *11. 
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as FCA defendants suddenly gained a powerful tool they could dispatch at any 
time to remove potentially duplicative qui tam suits.132 This resulted in the 
dismissal of cases long into the course of litigation.133 The retention of such a 
power by defendants not only runs the risk of wasting judicial resources,134 but 
it also creates additional uncertainty for relators who are already under tre-
mendous financial and emotional strain while spending years pursuing these 
cases.135 
Further, nonjurisdictional treatment would not go so far as to permit the 
class action suits or multiple identical suits Congress sought to avoid by enact-
ing § 3730(b)(5).136 First, a plaintiff still must file a well-pleaded complaint 
and failure to do so would result in dismissal of the claim under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).137 Second, the material facts test remains in place 
to prevent opportunistic latecomers from violating the first to file rule.138 This 
judicial test creates a defense against multiple suits with identical or materially 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the unfair impact jurisdictional rules 
have on FCA plaintiffs). 
 133 See, e.g., Cunningham, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 201–02 (granting a motion to dismiss seven years 
after Cunningham’s initial compliant and four years after McGuire’s complaint); Lujan II, 243 F.3d at 
1184–86 (dismissing an FCA claim nearly nine years after the initial filing). 
 134 See Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153 (noting that subject-matter jurisdiction objections 
can be raised at any time, that parties may not waive subject-matter jurisdiction, and that late subject-
matter jurisdiction objections waste judicial resources and unfairly prejudice litigants); see also Hen-
derson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434–35 (2011) (same). 
 135 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (summarizing New England Journal of Medicine and 
New Yorker interviews with whistleblowers and the distress they experienced after coming forward); see 
e.g., Steven Brill, America’s Most Admired Lawbreaker, HUFFINGTON POST HIGHLINE (Sept. 7, 2019, 
2:15 PM), https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/miracleindustry/americas-most-admired-lawbreaker [https://
perma.cc/UB66-N7S9] (detailing the experience of victims and relators in the FCA case against Johnson 
& Johnson). When whistleblowers are inside the company, they can choose to report secretly through 
the FCA qui tam process but typically remain at their jobs because any relator payout may be years 
away. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 3 (describing the secretive lives whistleblowers had to lead to 
avoid detection by co-workers).  
 136 See Heath, 791 F.3d at 121 (noting the court conducts a parallel evaluation of the claims and 
asks “whether the later complaint alleges a fraudulent scheme the government already would be 
equipped to investigate based on the first complaint”) (internal quotations omitted). This comparison 
operates just the same in a nonjurisdictional environment as it has when the first to file rule is consid-
ered jurisdictional; the only change is that the court evaluates the issue under the well-pleaded com-
plaint standard rather than upon a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 120–
21. 
 137 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Heath, 791 F.3d at 121 (“[T]he [first to file] rule bears only on 
whether a qui tam plaintiff has properly stated a claim.”). As several Supreme Court decisions demon-
strate, the well-pleaded complaint standard may still set a high bar for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding, in a discrimination case, a well pleaded complaint must 
meet a plausibility standard that requires the plaintiff’s pleading to include facts that allow the court to 
reasonably infer the defendant’s liability); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) 
(stating, in an anti-trust action, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because the complaint did not pre-
sent plausible grounds to infer a collusive agreement occurred).  
 138 See Millenium Labs., 923 F.3d at 251–54 (applying the material facts test after holding the 
first to file rule is nonjurisdictional). 
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similar facts to prior suits.139 The shift to nonjurisdictional treatment does not 
change the nature of this tool for FCA defendants, it merely changes the timing 
in which they must raise the claim.140 The change to a nonjurisdictional inter-
pretation creates more predictable timing, thereby giving relators a better sense 
of the road ahead, and ultimately fulfills the original 1863 FCA goal of pre-
venting the “great evil” of fraud against the United States.141 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 2019 decision 
in Millenium Laboratories not only follows a course set by the Supreme Court 
and the United States Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, it also fulfills a 
promise stretching back over 150 years: individuals should have a fair mecha-
nism to challenge fraud. The plain language of the FCA’s 1986 amendments, 
spurred by rampant healthcare fraud, provided this fair balance by increasing 
incentives for qui tam relators while providing protection to defendants against 
opportunistic latecomers seeking to duplicate prior suits. The courts tipped this 
scale of fairness, particularly the Lujan court and the subsequent courts that 
followed it, when they ruled that the first to file rule was jurisdictional. The 
shift to a nonjurisdictional interpretation, as demonstrated by the First Circuit, 
restores the balance and follows the Supreme Court’s bright line rule for statu-
tory interpretation of jurisdictional rules. 
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